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Abstract—When coming to perform shortest distance queries on encrypted graph data outsourced in external storage infrastructure
such as cloud, a significant challenge is how to compute the shortest distance in an accurate, efficient and secure way. This issue is
addressed by a recent work, which makes use of somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) to encrypt distance values output by a
2-hop cover labeling (2HCL) scheme. However, it may import large errors and even yield negative results. Besides, SWHE would be
too inefficient for normal clients. In this paper, we propose GENOA, a novel Graph ENcryption scheme for shOrtest distAnce queries.
GENOA employs only efficient symmetric-key primitives while significantly enhances the accuracy compared to the prior work. As a
reasonable trade-off, it additionally reveals the order information among queried distance values in the 2HCL index. We theoretically
prove the accuracy and security of GENOA under rigorous cryptographic model. Detailed experiments on eight real-world graphs
demonstrate that GENOA is efficient and can produce almost exact results.
Index Terms—Graph encryption, shortest distance, secure data outsourcing, 2-hop cover labeling.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
DATA outsourcing has become one of the most impor-tant applications in cloud computing, as it significantly
reduces clients’ costs on data storage and management [26],
[28]. However, the privacy of outsourced data might be
compromised as data owners have lost the physical control
over data [15]. To prevent privacy leakage, data should be
encrypted before outsourcing, especially when the storage
provider is untrusted. Traditional cryptographic encryption
tools directly destroy the data usability because encrypted
data is difficult to be queried. To address this problem, a
series of searchable encryption schemes (see a survey [5])
have been proposed, which enable the storage provider
to perform keyword searches on encrypted textual data
without leaking privacy information. Besides textual data,
graph data is also an important data type in many applica-
tions, such as social networks, road networks and biological
networks. However, few solutions have been proposed to
enable privacy-preserving queries on encrypted graph data,
which limits the applications of graph data outsourcing.
As one of the most fundamental graph queries, shortest
distance query has wide applications such as closeness
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Fig. 1. Computing the shortest distance using 2-hop cover labeling
scheme: an illustration.
testing in social networks, route planning in road networks,
causal reasoning in biological networks, etc. In this paper,
we investigate how to perform shortest distance queries
on encrypted graph data. That is, a data owner properly
encrypts a graph and outsources it to a storage provider
while the latter can still answer shortest distance queries
without learning useful information about the graph and
queries.
A series of 2-hop cover labeling (2HCL) schemes [27],
[2], [1], [14], [3], [24], [10] have been proposed to compute
shortest distances in plaintext setting. Such schemes pre-
compute an index so that subsequent shortest distance
queries can be answered efficiently. Specifically, given a
graph G, for each vertex v ∈ G the 2HCL scheme properly
collects a set S(v) of candidate vertices such that for each
vertex pair (s, t) there is at least one vertex u satisfying
that: (1) u ∈ S(s), (2) u ∈ S(t), and (3) u is on a shortest
(or an approximate shortest) path between s and t. Each
vertex v ∈ G is labeled with Lv = {(u, du,v)}u∈S(v),
in which u is a vertex identifier and du,v is the shortest
distance between u and v. The 2HCL index is the collection
of all labels, namely {Lv}v∈G. Given an index, answering
the shortest distance between vertices s and t is simply
computing min{du,s + du,t|(u, du,s) ∈ Ls, (u, du,t) ∈ Lt}.
Fig. 1 shows an example that how we obtain the shortest
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distance between vertices a and h.
Without encryption, the 2HCL index will reveal much
information to the storage provider. Firstly, as all the data
is unencrypted, the index directly reveals vertex identifiers
and distance values. Thus the storage provider is able to
compute the shortest distance between any two vertices
in the graph. Secondly, the number of labels in the index
reveals the number of vertices in the graph. Thirdly, the
index reveals the length of each label. And fourthly, during
queries, the storage provider learns which vertices are being
queried by the client. The above information may compro-
mise the privacy of the client. Therefore, our essential goal
in this paper is to appropriately encrypt the 2HCL index so
that the storage provider can still use it to answer shortest
distance queries.
The only existing approach fully addressing the above
issue appears in a recent work by Meng et al. [20]. How-
ever, their proposed GRECS scheme1 suffers accuracy and
efficiency drawbacks: (1) It may import large errors even
using an exact-2HCL scheme. As a result, their scheme
even yields negative distances in some cases. (2) It makes
use of somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) scheme
(e.g., the BGN construction in [4]) which simultaneously
supports multiple homomorphic additions and at least one
homomorphic multiplication. Compared with symmetric-
key cryptographic primitives such as pseudo-random func-
tions (PRFs), the SWHE scheme requires much more com-
putation. Hence, normal clients with limited computation
resources might be not able to use the scheme.
In this paper, we propose a new 2HCL-based graph en-
cryption scheme. Both our scheme and the GRECS scheme
in [20] are built on top of a 2HCL scheme, therefore the
accuracy of the two graph encryption schemes are theo-
rectically bounded by the accuracy of the 2HCL scheme.
The GRECS scheme additionally imports remarkable er-
rors onto the 2HCL scheme. Our scheme achieves higher
accuracy at the cost of leaking the order information among
part of the distance values in the 2HCL index. As a result,
our scheme almost maintains the accuracy of the 2HCL
scheme. Moreover, our scheme employs only symmetric-key
cryptographic primitives so that it is more efficient than the
GRECS scheme.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We address the issue of privacy-preserving shortest
distance query on encrypted graph data by defining
the framework of 2HCL-based graph encryption. In
particular, we present an accuracy definition which is
parametrized by the accuracy bounds of the underlying
2HCL scheme and the additional errors imported by the
specific design.
• We propose an order-preserving encryption scheme
OPE and show how to execute approximate shortest
distances on OPE -encrypted distance values.
• Using OPE as a building block, we propose GENOA,
a Graph ENcryption scheme for shOrtest distAnce
queries. GENOA is (1) general - supporting any 2HCL
schemes, (2) accurate - almost preserving the accuracy
1. Meng et al. [20] propose three graph encryption schemes in a
progressive way, which are respectively named GrephEnc1, GrephEnc2
and GrephEnc3 in their paper. In this paper, we discuss only the
GrephEnc3 scheme, and we denote it as GRECS for brevity.
of the underlying 2HCL scheme, (3) secure - revealing
limited information to the storage provider, and (4) effi-
cient - requiring low computation and space overheads.
• We implement GENOA and conduct detailed perfor-
mance evaluations on a number of real-world graphs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review
related work in Section 2. In Section 3 we present technical
preliminaries. In Section 4 we introduce how to perform
distance computations on encrypted values. We provide
detailed design of GENOA in Section 5 and its accuracy and
security proofs in Section 6. We explain our performance
evaluation results in Section 7. Finally, we conclude the
paper and discuss future directions in Section 8.
2 RELATED WORK
The study of querying encrypted data is first addressed to
enable keyword search on textual data [16], [13], [8], [7],
[25], [22]. The proposed schemes are commonly known as
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE). A milestone of SSE
is the work by Curtmola et al [11], as they gave a sound
security definition for SSE. Their security model was then
generalized by Chase and Kamara in [9] such that it adapts
to arbitrary structured data type, including graphs. In detail,
the security model uses leakage functions to capture what
is leaked during the execution of the system. A scheme
is considered secure if there is a simulator, who is given
the output of leakage functions, can simulate a runtime
environment which is indistinguishable from the real run-
time environment. As this security model has been widely
accepted in the literature, we use it in this paper.
Querying outsourced and encrypted graphs has drawn
more and more attention recently. The work by Chase and
Kamara [9] studied neighbor query which answers all the
neighbor vertices of the queried vertex, adjacency query
which returns 1 (or 0) if two queried vertices are adjacent
(or not), and a special subgraph query which returns a
subgraph containing all vertices either linked to or linked by
a set of queried vertices. In [29], Yin et al. studied privacy-
preserving reachability query. In [6], Cao et al. studied
subgraph query over an encrypted graph database, i.e.,
returning all graphs in the database that are supergraphs
of a queried graph. Shortest distance query was recently
studied by Meng et al. in [20]. Their scheme is also based on
a 2HCL scheme. It uses somewhat homomorphic encryption
to enable distance computations. However, SWHE does not
support the “min” operations so that the scheme is not
able to identify which is the shortest distance if there is
more than one candidate path, as the example shown in
Fig. 1. Therefore, the scheme loosens the accuracy to obtain
approximate shortest distances as we have discussed in
Section 4
There are a number of graph privacy works using dif-
ferent security models than ours. Some of them [30], [19],
[12] protect neighborhood information using anonymization
techniques, but do not consider other partial information of
the graph as well as the query privacy. Some approaches
[17], [21] hide the query information but completely leak the
information of the graph itself. Consequently, these works
are not fully addressing our data outsourcing scenario.
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Fig. 2. The system model of graph encryption: an illustration
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Graph Encryption Framework and System Model
We define the framework of 2HCL-based graph encryption
as follows:
Definition 1 (2HCL-based Graph Encryption). A 2HCL-
based graph encryption scheme Π is a collection of five
algorithms Π = (Init,Enc,Token,Dist,Dec):
• (K, {Lv}v∈G)← Init(λ,G): is an algorithm that takes as
input a security parameter λ and a graph G. It outputs
a secret key K and a 2HCL index {Lv}v∈G.
• I ← Enc(K, {Lv}v∈G): is an algorithm that takes as
input a secret key K and a 2HCL index {Lv}v∈G. It
outputs an encrypted index I .
• τs,t ← Token(K, s, t): is an algorithm that takes as input
a secret key K and two vertices s, t. It outputs a query
token τs,t.
• Ds,t ← Dist(I, τs,t): is an algorithm that takes as input
an index I and a token τs,t. It outputs an encrypted
distance Ds,t.
• ds,t ← Dec(K,Ds,t): is an algorithm that takes as
input a secret key K and an encrypted distance Ds,t.
It outputs a decrypted distance ds,t.
We consider a graph encryption system involving a
client C who owns a graph G and a storage provider P who
stores encrypted data outsourced by C. The system model
includes two protocols Setup and Query, defined as follows:
• Setup: C firstly obtains (K, {Lv}v∈G) ← Init(λ,G) and
then generates an index I ← Enc(K, {Lv}v∈G). Finally
C sends I to P . P receives and stores the index.
• Query: To query the shortest distance between vertices
s, t ∈ G, C obtains a token τs,t ← Token(K, s, t) and
sends it to P . P then computes Ds,t ← Dist(I, τs,t)
and returns it to C. Finally, C decrypts the distance as
ds,t ← Dec(K,Ds,t).
We show an illustration of the system model in Fig. 2.
3.2 Accuracy and Security
Different 2HCL schemes have different strategies for gen-
erating labels. Some [1], [14], [3] can answer exact shortest
distances while some [27], [2], [24], [10] only answer ap-
proximate shortest distances. We call the former exact-2HCL
schemes and the latter approximate-2HCL schemes. The
accuracy of a 2HCL scheme is described by a lower bound
Blower and an upper bound Bupper . For example, let ds,t
be the exact distance between arbitrary vertices s, t in the
graph, the approximate-2HCL scheme by Agarwal et al. [2]
has Blower(s, t) = ds,t and Bupper(s, t) = 2 · ds,t. Obviously,
any exact-2HCL scheme has Blower(s, t) = Bupper(s, t) =
ds,t.
In our framework a graph encryption scheme is built
upon a 2HCL scheme, thus the accuracy of the graph
encryption scheme depends on the accuracy bounds of the
underlying 2HCL scheme. Besides, the graph encryption
scheme may import additional errors due to specific design.
Thus we use two parameters α, β to denote how much the
graph encryption scheme breaks the lower bound and upper
bound of the underlying 2HCL scheme, respectively. Our
accuracy definition is as follows:
Definition 2 (Accuracy). Let Π = (Init,Enc,Token,Dist, Dec)
be a 2HCL-based graph encryption scheme. Given a
graph G and two veritces s, t ∈ G, let Blower and Bupper
be the accuracy lower and upper bound of the under-
lying 2HCL scheme. Assume λ is a security parameter.
We say Π achieves (Blower,Bupper, α, β)-accuracy if for
all graph G, s, t ∈ G,
Pr[Blower(s, t)−α ≤ ds,t ≤ Bupper(s, t)+β] ≥ 1−negl(λ)
where negl is a negligible function and ds,t is com-
puted using the following sequence: (K, {Lv}v∈G) ←
Init(λ,G), I ← Enc(K, {Lv}v∈G), τs,t ← Token(K, s, t),
Ds,t ← Dist(I, τs,t), ds,t ← Dec(K,Ds,t).
We define the security of a 2HCL-based graph encryp-
tion scheme using the standard simulation-based model
which has been widely adopted by secure computation
works [11], [9], [20], etc. We consider an adversary2 who
has access to all encrypted data and queries from C. The ad-
versary behaves honest-but-curious, namely, the adversary
honestly performs all operations required by our system
model but curiously infers private information from C’s data
and queries.
Definition 3 (Security). Let Π = (Init,Enc,Token, Dist,Dec)
be a 2HCL-based graph encryption scheme. Let Lsetup
and Lquery be leakage functions which capture the
leaked information during Setup and Query, respec-
tively. Let A be an adversary and S be a simulator.
Assume λ is a security parameter. We define two games
as follows:
• RealA(λ): A chooses a graph G. The game then
generates (K, {Lv}v∈G) ← Init(λ,G) and computes
I ← Enc(K, {Lv}v∈G) and gives I to A. Then A out-
puts a polynomial number of shortest distance queries:
q = {(s1, t1), ..., (sq, tq)}. For each query (s, t) ∈ q, the
game generates a token τs,t ← Token(K, s, t) and gives
it toA.A obtainsDs,t ← Dist(I, τs,t). FinallyA outputs
a bit b ∈ {0, 1} which is also the output of the game.
• IdealA,S(λ): A chooses a graph G. Given Lsetup(G), S
simulates an index I∗ and sends it toA. ThenA outputs
a polynomial number of shortest distance queries: q =
{(s1, t1), ..., (sq, tq)}. Given Lquery(G,q), S simulates
and sends to A a token τ∗s,t for each query (s, t) ∈ q.
A obtains D∗s,t ← Dist(I∗, τ∗s,t). Finally A outputs a bit
b ∈ {0, 1} which is also the output of the game.





λ A security parameter
K A secret key
G A graph
u, v, s, t Identifiers of vertices in the graph
U, V The encoded u, v
du,v The shortest distance from u to v
Du,v The encrypted shortest distance from u to v
Lu, Lv , Ls, Lt The labels of vertex u, v, s, t in the 2HCL index
I A graph encryption index
f, g Pseudo-Random Functions
We say Π achieves (Lsetup,Lquery)-security if for any prob-
ability polynomial time (PPT) adversary A there exists a
PPT simulator S such that
|Pr[RealA(λ) = 1]− Pr[IdealA,S(λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ).
where negl is a negligible function. The security model
guarantees that a secure graph encryption scheme does
not leak more than the output of leakage functions. We
present the specific leakage functions of our scheme in
Section 6.
3.3 Tools and Notations
2-hop cover labeling. A 2HCL scheme LAB consists of two
algorithms: the labeling algorithm Label and the shortest
distance calculation algorithm Dist. In this paper we only
use the labeling algorithm. Label takes as input a graph G,
it outputs a 2HCL index {Lv}v∈G. We call Lv the label of
vertex v, and the length of Lv is the number of (u, du,v)
pairs in Lv .
Cryptographic primitives. We use secure Symmetric-key
Encryption (SKE) and Pseudo-Random Function (PRF). As
SKE and PRF are common cryptographic primitives, we
omit their formal security definition in this paper.
Dictionary. Our index is built as a dictionary data struc-
ture. A dictionary I stores (key, value) pairs such that given
a key, the corresponding value can be returned inO(1) time.
We use I[key] to denote the value labeled by key in I . If key
does not exist in I , then I[key] returns ⊥.
Notations. In the rest of the paper, we use the nota-
tion “scheme.algorithm” to denote calling the algorithm
algorithm of scheme scheme. We use “y ← algorithm(x)”
for setting y as the output of algorithm algorithm on input
x. The notation “a||b” means a concatenation of string a and
b. “x $← X” means randomly selecting an element x from
set X .
3.4 Symbols
In the rest of the paper, although we offer definitions before
using symbols, we list general symbols and their descrip-
tions in Table 1 for ease of reading. Those symbols which
are associated with context are not listed here.
4 SHORTEST DISTANCE COMPUTATION ON EN-
CRYPTED VALUES
In this section we introduce how to encrypt distance values
in the 2HCL index so that shortest distance computations
can be performed on encrypted values.
As shown by the example in Fig. 1, the essential op-
erations of a shortest distance computation include add
operations (“+”) and a minimum search (“min”). Ideally,
an encryption required here should be not only additively-
homomorphic but also order-preserving. However, as far
as we know, such an encryption is still missing from the
current literature.
To address this problem, the work by Meng et
al. [20] leverages a somewhat homomorphic encryption
(SWHE=(Enc,Dec,Eval)) to support “+” operations over
encrypted distance values. Since the encryption is not
order-preserving, the subsequent “min” operation can-
not be calculated if there are more than one candi-
date result. Their idea is to derive an approximate re-
sult from all candidate results as follows: C encrypts
each distance value d in the 2HCL index as D ←
SWHE.Enc(K, 2dmax−d), in which dmax is the maximum
distance value. Given a query (s, t), P returns c =
Σ(u,Du,s)∈Ls,(u,Du,t)∈LtDu,s × Du,t, where “×” and “Σ”
are calculated by SWHE.Eval. Finally, C computes ds,t =
2dmax − log SWHE.Dec(K, c). For the example in Fig. 1, C
obtains da,h = 2dmax− log(22dmax−(1+2) + 22dmax−(3+1)) =
− log(2−3 + 2−4) ≈ 2.42. In general, min{r1, ..., rx} is
approximated as rapprox = − log(2−r1+, ...,+2−rx).
Their solution has three drawbacks: (1) It yields errors
whenever x > 1. (2) It may yield large relative errors,
especially when distance values are small and x is large.
For example, consider four candidate results 3,2,3,4, the
approximate result is 0.83, with a relative error 0.585. (3) It
is not friendly to large dmax, because large 2dmax−d would
increase the computation and space overhead.
Our idea comes from a very simple observation. When
comparing the sum of two values a, b and the sum of two
values c, d, if a ≤ c and b ≤ d then a + b ≤ c + d, while if
a ≥ c and b ≥ d then a+ b ≥ c+d. Therefore, in many cases
we are able to compare these two sums using only the order
of a, b, c, d. For the rest cases, i.e. a > c and b < d, or a < c
and b > d, these two sums are not theorectically comparable
using only the order information. Such an observation is
really helpful to answer shortest distance queries without
knowing exact distance values, because their order infor-
mation can be used to filter out most candidate results
(i.e. value pairs), which are comparable to and larger than
any one of other candidate result. To formalize the idea,
we construct an order-preserving encryption (OPE) scheme
OPE, which involves two encoding methods defined as
follows:
Definition 4 (Order Encoding (OE)). OE is a function that
takes as input a set S of values and a value d ∈ S. It
outputs the order (from small to large) of d in S.
For example, given a set S = {45, 23, 57, 7, 16}, then
OE(S, 45) = 4, OE(S, 23) = 3, OE(S, 57) = 5, OE(S, 7) = 1,
OE(S, 16) = 2.
Definition 5 (Interval Encoding (IE)). IE is a function that
takes as input a value dmin, a value dmax (dmax >
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Let S be the set of all distance values in the 2HCL index,
and dmin, dmax be the minimum and maximum value
respectively. Let SKE be an SKE.
• Enc(K, d): takes as input a secret key K and a
distance value d ∈ S to be encrypted. It outputs
(enc, ord, itv), in which enc ← SKE.Enc(K, d),
ord← OE(S, d), itv ← IE(dmin, dmax, k, d).
• Dec(K,D): takes as input a secret key K and an
encrypted value D. It parses D as (enc, ord, itv) and
outputs SKE.Dec(K, enc).
Fig. 3. The OPE scheme
dmin), an division parameter k (integer) and a value
dmin ≤ d ≤ dmax. It equally divides the interval
[dmin, dmax] into k sub-intervals labeled with order
numbers 0, ..., k − 1, and outputs the order number of
the sub-interval which contains d.
For example, given dmin = 0, dmax = 60 and k = 3,
then IE(dmin, dmax, k, 7) = 0, IE(dmin, dmax, k, 21) = 1,
IE(dmin, dmax, k, 35) = 1, IE(dmin, dmax, k, 52) = 2.
Fig. 3 presents our OPE scheme. As SKE is secure, the
leakage of OPE is from OE and IE, informally described as
follows:
• Order information. Order information indicates the
order-relations (i.e., “<”, “>” or “=”) between the un-
derlying values of any two encrypted values. Actually,
order information is leaked by any OPE [23].
• Interval information. Interval information is
parametrized by the division parameter k. It indicates
the order number of the sub-interval which contains
the underlying value of an encrypted value, but not
reveals any information about dmin, dmax.
We formally define order information and interval informa-
tion in Section 6. Actually, in OPE we can use a Determin-
istic Encryption (DET) instead of SKE, because the leakage
of DET is less than order information. Note that the leakage
of OPE is parametrized by k. When k = 1, OPE achieves
the optimal security for any order-preserving encryption
scheme, i.e., only leaking order information.
Let D1, D2 be two OPE-encrypted values, we say D1 <
D2, D1 = D2, D1 > D2 if D1.ord < D2.ord, D1.ord =
D2.ord, D1.ord > D2.ord, respectively. A candidate result
is a pair of two encrypted values (D1, D2) and we always
suppose D1 ≤ D2. If there is more than one candidate
results, we use two steps to filter out larger candidate
results. In the first step, we make use of order information.
Consider two candidate results (D1, D2) and (D3, D4), we
have:
• (D1, D2) = (D3, D4), if D1 = D3 and D2 = D4.
• (D1, D2) < (D3, D4), if D1 < D3 and D2 <= D4 or
D1 <= D3 and D2 < D4.
• (D1, D2) and (D3, D4) are not comparable, if D1 < D3
and D2 > D4, or D1 > D3 and D2 < D4.
Therefore, without performing “+” operations we can still
filter out most candidate results, each of which is at least
equal or larger than one of the other candidate results.
Given a set of candidate results, we define its Filtered Set
as follows:
Algorithm 1: Filter
Input: C : A set of candidate results
Output: F : A set of filtered candidate results
1 Initialize an empty set F
2 for c ∈ C do
3 flag = 0
4 for f ∈ F do
5 if c < f then
6 Remove f from F
7 else if c ≥ f then
8 flag = 1
9 break
10 if flag = 0 then
11 Add c into F
if F is empty then
12 Add c into F
13 Return F
Algorithm 2: Select
Input: F : A set of filtered candidate results
Output: R: A final result




Definition 6 (Filtered Set). Given a setC of candidate results,
its Filtered Set F satisfies: (1) F ⊆ C . (2) For all f ∈ F
and c ∈ C \ F , f ≤ c. (3) For any two candidate results
f1, f2 ∈ F , f1 and f2 are not comparable.
In Algorithm 1 we formulate an algorithm Filter for
generating Filtered Set.
According to the definition, the minimum candidate re-
sult must be in the Filtered Set. Since the candidate results in
Filtered Set are non-comparable to each other, we randomly
select one of them as the final result if there are still more
than one candidate results in the Filtered Set. In section 7 we
will show that only a few (normally two or three) candidate
results are left in Filtered Set. Though we have remarkable
chance to successfully select the minimum result, it is still
theoretically possible to select a candidate result which is
much larger than the minimum one. Therefore, in the second
step, we make use of the interval information to bound
errors. Given a Filtered Set, we select the final result with
the minimum sum of sub-interval order numbers, as shown
in Algorithm 2.
We theoretically and experimentally analyze the accu-
racy of our solution in Section 6 and Section 7, respectively.
5 OUR GRAPH ENCRYPTION SCHEME
Using OPE as a building block, we present our graph en-
cryption scheme for shortest distance queries. In our design,
we use two specific PRFs f, g with the following parameters:
f : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ
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• Setup: C selects a random key K and inputs a
graph G. Then he/she generates the 2HCL index
{Lv}v∈G ← LAB.Label(G). For each (u, du,v) ∈ Lv ,
C uses PRF f to encode vertex identifier u as
U ← f(K,u||0), and uses OPE to encrypt distance
value du,v as Du,v ← OPE.Enc(K, du,v). For each
v ∈ G, C computes a token Tv ← f(K, v||1), and
inserts all (Tv, Lv) pairs into a dictionary I which
we refer to as an encrypted index. At last, C sends I
to P
• Query: C inputs two vertices s, t, computes their
tokens Ts ← f(K, s||1), Tt ← f(K, t||1), and sends
Ts, Tt to P . P searches in the index I and obtains
Ls, Lt. For each encoded vertex identifier U that
both appears in Ls and Lt, P obtains a candidate
result (Du,s, Du,t). After performing Filter and Se-
lect P returns the selected result r to C. Finally, C
decrypts the two distance values in r and calculates
the sum as the shortest distance between s, t.
Fig. 4. The straightforward graph encryption scheme
g : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ+2·len(int)
where λ is the security parameter and len(int) is the num-
ber of bits used for storing an integer value.
5.1 Overview of a straightforward approach
We start with a straightforward graph encryption scheme
described in Fig. 4. At a high-level, The straightforward
scheme works as follows: During Setup phrase, C computes
a 2HCL index and encodes each vertex identifier using
f while encrypts each distance value using OPE. C then
outsources the encrypted 2HCL index to P . During Query
phase, C computes the encoded form of the two vertices
to be queried and sends them to P . P then locates the
corresponding two entries in the index, computes an en-
crypted result using the method we discussed in Section 4,
and returns the result to C. Finally, C decrypts the result.
The straightforward scheme successfully answers short-
est distance queries on encrypted graph. However, though
it encodes all vertex identifiers and distance values, it still
leaks much information. Firstly, it leaks the length of each
Lv . Secondly, note that f is a deterministic function, P
can judge the equality of any two encoded vertices in the
index. In this sense, the straightforward scheme leaks the
number of common vertices between any two labels. Once
the number is zero,P learns that the underlying two vertices
are unreachable. Thirdly, it leaks the order information and
interval information of all distance values in the 2HCL
index.
5.2 Our main graph encryption scheme GENOA
We now present our main graph encryption scheme
GENOA, which prevents the information leakage of the
straightforward scheme. We describe the five algorithms
(Definition 1), respectively.
Init. In the initialization algorithm, we pick a random key
K and generate 2HCL labels using LAB.Label as the same
Algorithm 3: Init
Input: (λ,G): A security parameter and a graph




2 {Lv}v∈G ← LAB.Label(G)
3 Return (K, {Lv}v∈G)
Algorithm 4: Enc
Input: (K, {Lv}v∈G): A secret key and a set of labels
Output: I : An index
1 Initialize a dictionary I
2 for v ∈ G do
3 Tv ← f(K, v||1)
4 Kv ← f(K, v||2)
5 Initialize a counter c = 0
6 for (u, du,v) ∈ Lv do
7 U ← f(K,u||0)
8 Du,v ← OPE.Enc(K, du,v)
9 Tu,v ← f(Tv, c)
10 Ku,v ← g(Kv, c)
11 Cu,v = Ku,v ⊕ (U ||Du,v.ord||Du,v.itv)
12 I[Tu,v] = (Cu,v, Du,v.enc)
13 c = c+ 1
14 return I
Algorithm 5: Token
Input: (K, s, t): A secret key and two vertices
Output: τs,t: A token
1 Ts ← f(K, s||1), Ks ← f(K, s||2)
2 Tt ← f(K, t||1), Kt ← f(K, t||2)
3 return τs,t ← (Ts, Tt,Ks,Kt)
in the straightforward scheme. The algorithm is formulated
in Algorithm 3.
Enc. We make several changes for label encryptions. In
detail, we use two leakage prevention methods, as follows:
Index Obfuscation. To hide the length of each Lv , we
unpack Lv and store each (U,Du,v) ∈ Lv into the in-
dex respectively. The idea is from a searchable encryption
work by Cash et al. [7], which hides the number of data
files containing a specific keyword. After assigning a token
Tv ← f(K, v||1) for Lv , we further use Tv to compute a
sub-token Tu,v for each (U,Du,v) ∈ Lv as follows: Suppose
Lv contains l pairs, we generate l sub-tokens as the output
of f(Tv, c) in which c is an integer counter increasing from
1 to l. Finally, we store each (U,Du,v) ∈ Lv into the index I
such that it is indexed by its sub-token Tu,v .
2-Round Encryption. During a query, we have to reveal
the number of common vertices (i.e., the number of can-
didate results) of the involved labels, the order informa-
tion and the interval information of the distance values
stored in the involved labels. However, for those labels
having not been queried, we should avoid above leakage.
Therefore, we use another round of encryption, which ran-
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Algorithm 6: Dist
Input: (I, τs,t): An index and a token
Output: Ds,t: An encrypted result
1 Parse τs,t as (Ts, Tt,Ks,Kt)
2 Initialize two set Ls, Lt
3 for c = 0 until I[Tu,s] = ⊥ do
4 Tu,s ← f(Ts, c)
5 Ku,s ← g(Ks, c)
6 (Cu,s, Du,s.enc)← I[Tu,s]
7 U ||Du,s.ord||Du,s.itv = Ku,s ⊕ Cu,s
8 Du,s ← (Du,s.enc,Du,s.ord,Du,s.itv)
9 Insert (U,Du,s) into Ls
10 for c = 0 until I[Tu,t] = ⊥ do
11 Tu,t ← f(Tt, c)
12 Ku,t ← g(Kt, c)
13 (Cu,t, Du,t.enc)← I[Tu,t]
14 U ||Du,t.ord||Du,t.itv = Ku,t ⊕ Cu,t
15 Du,t ← (Du,t.enc,Du,t.ord,Du,t.itv)
16 Insert (U,Du,t) into Lt
17 Initialize a set C
18 Insert all (D1, D2) into C where (U1, D1) ∈ Ls,
(U2, D2) ∈ Lt, and U1 = U2
19 F ← Filter(C)
20 Ds,t ← Select(F )
21 Return Ds,t
Algorithm 7: Dec
Input: K,Ds,t: A secret key and an encrypted result
Output: ds,t: A distance value
1 Parse Ds,t as (D1, D2)
2 d1 ← OPE.Dec(K,D1)
3 d2 ← OPE.Dec(K,D2)
4 Return ds,t = d1 + d2
domizes the output of f , OE and IE. Specifically, for each
(U,Du,v) ∈ Lv, v ∈ G, we encrypt U , Du,v.ord, Du,v.itv as
Cu,v = Ku,v ⊕ (U ||Du,v.ord||Du,v.itv), where Ku,v is gen-
erated in the similar way we compute sub-tokens, namely,
assigning a per-vertex key Kv ← f(K, v||2) for v and
computing sub-keys Ku,v ← f(Kv, c) with an increasing
counter c.
For the convenience of readers, we summarize the usage
of f as follows:
• V ← f(K, v||0): is to encode the vertex identifier v.
• Tv ← f(K, v||1): is to generate the token of v.
• Kv ← f(K, v||2): is to generate the per-vertex key of v.
• Tu,v ← f(Tv, c): is to generate the sub-tokens for the
pairs in Lv .
• Ku,v ← f(Kv, c): is to generate the sub-keys for the
pairs in Lv .
The formal description of Enc is presented in Algorithm
4.
Token. A query token for vertex pair (s, t) includes (1)
label tokens Ts, Tt, which are used to compute the sub-
tokens, and (2) per-vertex keys Ks,Kt, which are used to
compute the sub-keys. We formulate Token in Algorithm 5.
Dist. Upon receiving the token Ts,t,P first computes sub-
tokens Tu,s ← f(Ts, c), Tu,t ← f(Tt, c) with an increas-
ing counter c, and obtains all two-round-encrypted pairs.
Meanwhile, P computes the sub-keys Ku,s ← f(Ks, c),
Ku,t ← f(Kt, c) with an increasing counter c, decrypts the
second round encryptions and repacks Ls and Lt respec-
tively. Then, P searches common vertices between Ls and
Lt and forms a set of candidate results. Finally, P executes
Filter and Select to obtain a final result. We formulate Dist
in Algorithm 6.
Dec. Upon receiving the encrypted result Ds,t from
P . C parses it as (D1, D2) and decrypts them as d1 ←
OPE.Dec(K,D1) and d2 ← OPE.Dec(K,D2). Finally C
gets the (approximate) shortest distance ds,t = d1 + d2. We
formulate Dec in Algorithm 7.
Using Algorithm 3-7, we formulate protocol Setup and
Query in Protocol 1,2.
6 ACCURACY AND SECURITY PROOFS
Theorem 1. If SKE is a secure SKE, f, g are secure PRFs, and
LAB has accuracy lower bound Blower and upper bound




)−accuracy for k = 1, 2
and (Blower,Bupper, 0, 2 ·
dmax − dmin
k
) − accuracy for
k > 2, in which dmax, dmin are the maximum and
minimum distance values in the 2HCL index output by
LAB.Label(G) and k is the division parameter.
Proof: For any graph G and vertices s, t ∈ G, let dLABs,t
be the resultant shortest distance output by LAB, i.e.,
dLABs,t = min{dLABu,s + dLABu,t |(u, dLABu,s ) ∈ LLABs , (u, dLABu,t ) ∈ LLABt }
where LLABs , L
LAB
t ∈ {LLABv }v∈G ← LAB.Label(G), and let
ds,t be the resultant shortest distance output by GENOA,
i.e., (K, {LLABv }v∈G) ← Init(λ,G), I ← Enc(K, {LLABv }v∈G),
τs,t ← Token(K, s, t), Ds,t ← Dist(I, τs,t), ds,t ←
Dec(K,Ds,t).
According to Algorithm 4, 5, for any v ∈ G, we can
retrieve the encrypted version of LLABv except that with neg-
ligible probability collisions happen amongst the outputs
of f . As g is also a secure PRF, we can correctly decrypt
the second round encryption and obtain all (U,D) pairs,
where U ← f(K,u||0) and D ← OPE.Enc(K, d) for all
(u, d) ∈ LLABv . Consider a pair (u1, d1) ∈ LLABs and a
pair (u2, d2) ∈ LLABt , we have f(K,u1||0) = f(K,u2||0)
if u1 = u2, and f(K,u1||0) 6= f(K,u2||0) if u1 6= u2 except
that with negligible probability collisions happen amongst
the outputs f . Therefore, with high probability the candi-
date results extracted from encrypted labels are exactly the
OPE ciphertexts of that extracted from unencrypted labels.
As SKE used in OPE is secure, all encrypted candidate
results can be correctly decrypted. Therefore, we have:
Pr[ds,t = Filter(Select(C))] ≥ 1− negl(λ)
where C is the candidate result set extracted from LLABs and
LLABt .




t and ds,t results
from ds + dt. Note that dLABs,t = min{d1 + d2|(d1, d2) ∈ C}.
Thus:






I ← Enc(K, {Lv}v∈G)





τs,t ← Token(K, s, t)




According to the definition of Filter, we have:








dLABs = ds and d
LAB
t = dt
Suppose itv(dLABs ) ← IE(dmin, dmax, k, dLABs ),
itv(dLABt ) ← IE(dmin, dmax, k, dLABt ), itv(ds) ←





itv(dLABs ) · l ≤ dLABs < itv(dLABs ) · l + l
itv(dLABt ) · l ≤ dLABt < itv(dLABt ) · l + l
itv(ds) · l ≤ ds < itv(ds) · l + l
itv(dt) · l ≤ dt < itv(dt) · l + l
According to the definition of Select, we have:
itv(dLABs ) + itv(d
LAB
t ) = itv(ds) + itv(dt)
Therefore:
(ds + dt)− (dLABs + dLABt )
<itv(ds) · l + l + itv(dt) · l + l − itv(dLABs ) · l − itv(dLABt ) · l
=2 · l
However, when k = 1, 2, it holds that itv(dLABs ) = itv(ds)
and itv(dLABt ) = itv(dt). We have:
(ds + dt)− (dLABs + dLABt )
=(ds − dLABs ) + (dt − dLABt )
<l
Since Blower(s, t) ≤ dLABs,t ≤ Bupper(s, t), we have:
Pr[Blower(s, t) ≤ ds,t ≤ Bupper(s, t) + 2 · l] ≥ 1− negl(λ)
for k > 2, and:
Pr[Blower(s, t) ≤ ds,t ≤ Bupper(s, t) + l] ≥ 1− negl(λ)
for k = 1, 2.
Before the security proof of GENOA, we first describe the
leakage functions of the scheme. In the Setup protocol, by
observing the length of the encrypted index the adversary
only learns the total number of (u, d) pairs in the 2HCL
index. Therefore, given a graph G
Lsetup(G) = Σv∈G|Lv|
where Lv ∈ LAB.Label(G).
During a single query (s, t) in Query protocol, the adver-
sary learns how many (u, d) pairs are in Ls and Lt. After
decrypting the second round encryptions the adversary
learns the number of common vertices between Ls and Lt,
and the order information and interval information for all
underlying distance values stored in Ls and Lt.
To understand what is additionally leaked during multi-
ple queries, we first consider what the adversary addition-
ally learns from two queries (s1, t1) and (s2, t2). Since f
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is deterministic, by observing the tokens the adversary is
able to identify the equivalence among s1, t1, s2, t2 (e.g.,
s1 6= t1, s1 = s2, t1 = t2). We call such information the
repetition information as the adversary learns whether a
vertex is repeatedly queried. For multiple queries, the adver-
sary additionally learns the repetition information among all
queries. In summary, given a graph G and a sequence of q
queries q = (s1, t1), ..., (sq, tq),
Lquery(G,q) = (len, num, ord, itv, rep)
where len, num, ord, itv, rep are formally defined as follows:
• Length information (len). len is an array of size 2q such
that len[i] = |Lsi | for i = 1, 3, ..., 2q − 1 and len[i] =
|Lti | for i = 2, 4, ..., 2q, where Lv ∈ LAB.Label(G).
• Number of common vertices information (num). num is
an array of size q such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ q
num[i] = |{u|(u, ∗) ∈ Lsi , (u, ∗) ∈ Lsi}|, where
Lv ∈ LAB.Label(G) and ∗ denotes arbitrary distance
value).
• Order information (ord). Let S be the set of all dis-
tance values in LAB.Label(G). ord is an array of size
Σ1≤i≤2q len[i] such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ Σ1≤i≤2q len[i]
ord[i] = {OE(S, d)|(u, d) ∈ Ls1 ||Lt1 ||...||Lsq ||Ltq}.
• Interval information (itv). Let S be the set of all dis-
tance values in LAB.Label(G). itv is an array of size
Σ1≤i≤2q len[i] such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ Σ1≤i≤2q len[i]
itv[i] = {IE(S, d)|(u, d) ∈ Ls1 ||Lt1 ||...||Lsq ||Ltq}.
• Repetition information (rep). rep is an array of size q
such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ q rep[i] = (x, y) if si, ti is the
xth,yth different vertex in the sequence s1, t1, ..., si, ti,
respectively.
We now prove the security of GENOA.
Theorem 2. If SKE is a secure SKE, f, g are secure PRFs, then
GENOA achieves (Lsetup,Lquery)-security.
Proof: At a high level, the proof is to construct a
simulator S in the game Ideal, who uses Lsetup and
Lquery to simulate a proper index I∗, and tokens τ∗s,t for
all (s, t) ∈ q. In the following proofs, we say X and X∗
are indistinguishable to A to mean that the probability of
distinguishing X and X∗ is bounded by negl(λ).
Let m = Σ1≤i≤2q len[i]. S simulates a set of Σv∈G|Lv|
distance values S∗ = {d∗1, ..., d∗m} such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
OE(S∗, d∗i ) = ord[i] and IE(min{S∗},max{S∗},max{itv}+
1, d∗i ) = itv[i]. Then, S simulates m vertex identifiers
u∗1, ..., u
∗









that (1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2q, |Li| = len[i] and (2) for
1 ≤ i ≤ q, the number of common vertices in L∗2i−1
and L∗2i is equal to num[i]. S then deletes repetitive labels
and finally obtains, say p different labels. Let’s re-denote
them as L∗1, ..., L
∗
p. S simulates L∗p+1 such that all vertex
identifiers and distance values are randomly chosen and
|L∗p+1| = Σv∈G|Lv| − Σ1≤i≤p|L∗i |. Then S is ready to
simulate index and tokens.
Simulating the index I∗. S sets K∗ $← {0, 1}λ and obtains
I∗ ← GENOA.Enc(K, {Li}1≤i≤p+1). Since Σv∈G|Lv| =
Σ1≤i≤p+1|L∗i |, the length of I and I∗ are equal. Since SKE,
f and g are secure, the content of I and I∗ are indistinguish-
able to A before queries.
Simulating the query τ∗si,ti (1 ≤ i ≤ q). S parses rep[i]
as (x, y) and obtains τ∗x,y ← Token(K∗, si, ti). Since f is
secure, (si, ti) and (s∗i , t
∗
i ) are indistinguishable to A. Since
SKE, f and g are secure, the distance computation process
and outcome of I and I∗ are indistinguishable to A during
queries.
Therefore, the view of A in game Real and Ideal are
indistinguishable to A, i.e.,
|Pr[RealA(λ) = 1]− Pr[IdealA,S(λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ).
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of GENOA. All
test programs were written in Python and run on a 64-bit
Windows machine with Intel Core i5-4570 (3.20GHz) CPU
and 8GB RAM. We implemented the 2-hop cover labeling
scheme proposed by Akiba, Lwata and Yoshida [3], which
is an exact-2HCL. SKE and PRFs were implemented using
AES and HMAC from the Python Cryptography Toolkit3
(PyCrypto). The security parameter was set as 128-bit. The
default value of k is set as 16, however, the setting of k does




Dataset Type Vertices Edges
Facebook social network 4,039 88,234
GrQc collaboration network 5,242 14,496
Gnutella file sharing network 8,846 31,839
HepPh collaboration network 12,008 118,521
AstroPh collaboration network 18,772 198,110
CondMat collaboration network 23,133 93,497
Enron email communication network 36,692 183,831
Brightkite social network 58,228 214,078
We selected various scales of real-world graphs from
SNAP [18], as shown in Table 2. For Facebook and
Brightkite, each vertex stands for a user and each edge
stands for a friend relationship. GrQc, HepPh, AstroPh and
CmonMat are collaboration networks of Arxiv on different
research areas, in which each vertex represents an author
and each edge represents a co-authorship. Gnutella is a peer-
to-peer file sharing network, where each vertex represents a
host in the Gnutella network topology and each edge rep-
resents a connection between two hosts. Enron is an email
communication network, where each vertex represents an
email address and each edge represents that there is at least
one email exchange between the two addresses. Each edge
in all networks were assigned a random decimal distance
value in the range [0,10] with the precision 0.01.
Since the experiment results in the following sections are
highly related to the number of (u, d) pairs in the 2HCL
index, here we report such numbers on all 8 datasets in Fig.
5. We can see that the number of (u, d) pairs does not strictly
scale with the number of vertices or the number of edges.
This is because the number of pairs is also affected by the































































































































Fig. 6. Execution time for Setup.
7.2 Overview of Complexities
Before experimental study, we compare theorectical com-
plexities of GRECS and GENOA in Table 3. Since both sinces
are built on top of a 2HCL scheme, their overheads are
highly depends on the size of the 2HCL index generated
from the 2HCL scheme. In Table 3, we use n to denote
the number of vertices in the graph and m to denote the
length of the label in 2HCL index. As a result, both schemes
achieve same computation and commication complexities.
However, GENOA uses the light-weight OPE instead of
SWHE, therefore GENOA is more computationally efficient
than GRECS in reality.
TABLE 3
Complexity
Scheme Space Setup Time Query Time Communication
GRECS O(mn) O(mn) O(m) O(1)
GENOA O(mn) O(mn) O(m) O(1)
7.3 Setup Performance
We report the execution time and the resultant index size of
Setup. We split the entire Setup time into label generation
time and label encryption time, as shown in Fig. 6. As
the label generation time is decided by the specific 2HCL
scheme, we refer the readers to [3] for detailed analyses. We
can see from Fig. 5(a),6(a) that the total encryption time is
linear in the number of (u, d) pairs, which roughly grows
with the size of the network. Even for dataset Brightkite
with more than 2.5 million pairs, the encryption finished in
about 3 minutes. In Fig. 6(b) we divide the results by the
number of vertices. The per-vertex encryption times are less
than 10 millisecond for all datasets.
Fig. 7(a) reports the index sizes. According to
GENOA.Enc (Algorithm 4), the index size should be also
linear in the number of (u, d) pairs. In the experiment
results, the smallest index is about 29 MB (on Facebook)
while the largest index is about 578 MB (on Brightkite).
Normally, exact-2HCL schemes yield more (u, d) pairs than
approximate-2HCL schemes. In this sense, we can get even
smaller index if we use an approximate-2HCL scheme. In
Fig. 7(b), we present the per-vertex sizes. The results range





























































































































Fig. 8. Execution time for Query
7.4 Query Performance
Protocol Query involves client-side (i.e., C-side) token gen-
eration (Algorithm 5), result decryption (Algorithm 7) and
server-side (i.e., P-side) distance computation (Algorithm
6). If P finds no candidate result for a query, C will set
the result as zero without decryption. In such a case, we
set the decryption time as zero. In the tests we chose 10,000
random queries and obtained the average execution time, as
shown in Fig. 8. From Algorithm 5 we can see that the token
generation time is independent of the dataset. Thus the to-
ken generation times stabilize at about 0.1 milliseconds. The
result decryption times are quite small because Algorithm 7
requires only two SKE decryptions. According to Algorithm
6, the distance computation time is decided by the length of
Ls, Lt and the number of candidate results. Specifically, an
execution requires |Ls|+ |Lt| PRF computations, dictionary
searches and XORs, |Ls| × |Lt| condition judgments, a Filter
execution and a Select execution. The results show that
the distance computation is fairly time saving. Even for
Gnutella, whose per-vertex pair number is the largest, the



































Fig. 9. Performance of algorithm Filter
7.5 Accuracy
We first show the results on the performance of Filter
(Algorithm 1) in Fig. 9. The average number of candidate
results in a query ranges from 7.2 (on Facebook) to 36.1
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Fig. 11. Mean of related error.
significantly reduce, ranging from 1.6 (on GrQc) to 3.2
(on Gnutella). The results indicate that P have remarkable
chance to obtain the exact distance even without using the
interval information.
We compared the accuracy of the proposed GENOA
scheme and the scheme in [20] (called GRECS). In the tests
we chose 10,000 random queries and obtained the average
percentage of exact results and the average related error for
both schemes. For GENOA, we separately set the division
parameter k used in Select (Algorithm 2) as 1, 16, 64. From
Fig. 10 we can see that GENOA yields much more exact
results than GRECS even when k = 1. Larger k helps to
increase the accuracy. For all datasets, more than 50% results
of GENOA are exact when k = 64. Fig. 11 reports the means
of related error. For all datasets, the related error of GENOA
is smaller than 0.1 when k = 1 and 0.02 when k = 64.
However, the related error of GRECS is higher than 0.2 for
7 out of 8 datasets, and even exceeds 0.6 on AstroPh.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a 2-hop cover labeling based
graph encryption scheme to answer shortest distance
queries on an encrypted and remotely stored graph. Com-
pared to prior work, our scheme can be seen as an alter-
native for users who desire high efficiency and accuracy, as
our experimental results show that the scheme is quite time-
saving, space-saving, and can answer almost exact shortest
distances. We believe that the leakage of our scheme is
acceptable in many applications.
Potential future research directions are summarized as
follows. (1) Although leakage of a graph encryption scheme
can be precisely define, it is not clear that how much risk
users would take in reality. We need deeper understanding
of the leakage such as query patterns. One of the possible
solutions would be to explore attacks which exploit the
leakage to obtain private information. (2) Another research
direction is to design graph encryption schemes which
support higher-lvel query types. For exampple, using the
GENOA scheme as a building block, one can construct
provably secure graph encryption schemes supporting k-
nearest neighbor (kNN). (3) It is also interesting to explore
stronger adversary models, such as malicious adversary
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